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ABSTRACT
The approach taken in this paper, to capture the international state of technolog-
ical progress, goes through the so-called technological frontier. The technological
frontier shows, for a given distribution of the net national product, the combina-
tion of production activities that would yield the highest wage income; equivalently
the cost minimising choice of techniques. Different versions of the technological
frontier are computed for a selection of OECD countries using input–output data
1970–2005. From these frontiers a set of indices is extracted to provide global
as well as country-specific condensed measures of technological progress. Among
the results are evidence of a global development that shows a more moderate rate
of productivity growth compared with the conventional stylized facts of a 1.5–2.0
percent year-to-year increase and evidence of an economic development in the US
driven at least as much by an increased work effort as by an increased productivity.
The technological frontiers are intrinsically difficult to compute, but by applying
two theoretical properties associated with the switch points between techniques
of production, an algorithm is developed and invoked to efficiently compute the
frontiers.
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1 Introduction
The concept of technological progress is not a simple or straightforward
one. Intratemporal and intertemporal comparison of technological possi-
bilities is problematic, because also in its ideal type conceptualization the
intrinsic nature of most commodities changes according to time and space.
New commodities are introduced and either substitute old ones or coexist;
new methods of production and new markets emerge so as to influence the
prices and trade; exhaustible resources are depleted cutting off access to old
production techniques; and so on and so forth. Normally the process of
technological innovation is studied focusing on the creation of new products
or on new ways to produce the same product. But for the whole system the
detection of technological progress is problematic.
The problem of measuring technological progress is related to aggrega-
tion and hence to some form of indexation. Normally comparison between
bundles of different types of commodities is in the literature made following
two methods or a combination of them: the value method and the index
number method. In the value method the different commodities are assigned
a value in terms of the value of a numéraire (which is either one single com-
modity or a bundle of commodities), while in the index number method the
heterogeneous physical commodities are transformed into an index number.
Both methods are problematic and have been widely discussed in the litera-
ture. The value method has been studied since Smith and Ricardo’s labour
theory of value and the index number problem is still centred around Irving
Fisher’s 1922 study on ’The Making of Index Numbers’.
The literature on index number is enormous and here we will not make
a review. What are sufficient to point out are two things. Firstly, that the
function of an index number is to transform something which is intrinsically
heterogeneous into a homogeneous (scalar) magnitude.
Second, that there is broad consensus that the ideal index number, in the
sense of Fisher (1922), does not exist and hence cannot be constructed. See
among many Leontief (1936), Afriat (1977), Samuelson and Swamy (1974),
and Velupillai and Zambelli (1993). Samuelson and Swamy (1974, p. 568)
in their survey on invariant economic index numbers summarize and declare
at the outset that
we cannot hope for one ideal formula for the index number: if it
works for the tastes of Jack Spratt, it won’t work for his wife’s tastes;
if, say, a Cobb-Douglas function can be found that works for him with
one set of parameters and for her with another set, their daughter
will in general require a non-Cobb-Douglas formula! Just as there
is an uncountable infinity of different indifference contours—there is
no counting tastes—there is an uncountable infinity of different index
number formulas, which dooms Fisher’s search for the ideal one. It
does not exist even in Plato’s heaven.
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The approach taken in this paper, to capture the state of technological
progress, goes through the so-called technological frontier. The technologi-
cal frontier shows, for a given uniform rate of profit, what combination of
production activities that would yield the highest wage income, i.e., the en-
velope of all the possible wage-profit frontiers that can be constructed from a
given set of production techniques; equivalent to the cost minimising choice
of production activities.1 One advantage of using wage-profit frontiers is
that it takes into account the fact that new techniques generate a different
demand vector of the factors of production and eventually different prices
and hence different costs and revenues.
From this approach we will construct indices that in several ways differ
from the orthodox indices referred to by Samuelson and Swamy in the quo-
tation above. The orthodox indices take as given (homothetic) preference
and use these as weights in the process of aggregation. As pointed out,
Jack Spratt might possess a particular Cobb-Douglas utility function, but
his family might not.2
The method we propose use on the other hand production costs, mea-
sured in prices of production, as weights in the process of aggregation. The
prices of production have the advantage of taking into account both the
production techniques and the demand for means of production. Hence,
where neoclassical indices are generated using axiomatic preferences, we
use uniquely determined (endogenous) prices of production.3 The prices of
production do not however take into account the demand for final consump-
tion, but following the Non-substitution theorem, the production prices are
independent of the composition of the vector of final consumption.4 It is
a major advantage that the wage-profit frontiers are independent of simple
differences in the scale of production, even if the changes are asymmetric
across industries.
Take note, this does not imply that we assume constant returns to scale.
If changes occur in the scale of production in one or more industries, without
changing the proportional use of the means of production (including labour),
then the wage-profit frontiers, together with the indices based hereupon,
remain unaffected. If on the other hand the relative proportions of the means
1This problem could just as well have been stated as the highest level of consumption
for a given uniform growth rate. For more information on this duality see Pasinetti (1977,
ch. 7), Bruno (1969), and Burmeister and Kuga (1970).
2For those, as we, who wonder whom this mysteries Jack Spratt might be. He, spelled
as Jack Sprat, appears in a fitting nursery rhyme, (thanks to Wikipedia):
Jack Sprat could eat no fat.
His wife could eat no lean.
And so between them both, you see,
They licked the platter clean.
3For an introduction to the neoclassical theory of index numbers and productivity
measurement, see Coelli et. al. (2001).
4Explained in Section 2.
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of production are affected, then it will influence the vector of production
prices, which subsequently together with the new production techniques are
used to assess the consequences of the technical innovations for the economy
as a whole.
The technological frontier is found in both ’smooth’ neoclassical eco-
nomics and ’discrete’ technologies models. As observed by Bruno (1969,
p. 51) ”any neo-classical technology could be simulated by a ’very dense’
spectrum of discrete techniques”, hence the approach taken in this paper is
not necessarily restricted to the unorthodox setting in which it is framed.
We compute and study three different versions of the so-called techno-
logical frontier using input–output data from eight OECD countries from
1970–2005 with five year intervals. The three frontiers we shall call respec-
tively; the contemporary, the rolling, and the intertemporal technological
frontier—all theoretical constructs with their own set of useful applications.
The contemporary technological frontiers are constructed from all the
production techniques extracted from the OECD input–output tables avail-
able for a given year, i.e., from a range of countries at a given point in time
(one accounting period). Comparing the contemporary technological fron-
tiers with the actual wage-profit frontiers for the individual countries can
be used to study efficiency since the contemporary technological frontier,
at a given point in time, provides a measure of the maximum potentials for
international trade and/or gains by exchange of production techniques. Fur-
thermore, the evolution of the contemporary technological frontiers provides
a measure of global technological progress.
The rolling technological frontiers are the envelopes formed by the pro-
duction techniques available in 1970; 1970,1975; ...; 1970,1975,...,2005, i.e.,
a backward looking set of production techniques, which together with the
contemporary technological frontiers are used to study which countries’
industry-level production techniques that are the most effective, and how
this displacement of production techniques evolves over time.
The intertemporal technological frontier, equivalent to the last of the
rolling technological frontiers, is computed from the full set of techniques
available over time and across countries. The intertemporal technological
frontier provides a theoretical global and intertemporal measure of the max-
imum economic potentials for the ’world economy’ as a whole.5 The in-
tertemporal technological frontier is also useful in the study of convergence.
In particular, as an alternative to the usual approach of using the US as a
reference point, this is problematic because the reference point itself change
over time.
The country specific wage-profit frontiers, the contemporary technolog-
5By the world economy we here mean the eight OECD countries. Contingent on data
availability, this analysis could and should of course be extended to include additional
countries.
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ical frontiers, and the intertemporal technological frontier are combined to
construct indices for country specific technological progress and global con-
vergence towards the maximum theoretical technical potentials. These in-
dices provide both empirically and conceptually new insight to the well-
known catching up hypothesis.6 Among the problems confronted, is the
fundamental question; is the US (the leader) catching up?
Common for the different versions of the technological frontiers is that
they can be seen as an empirical proxy for what is known in the literature
on economic development as the access to technology constraint, i.e., the
situation in which a country is approaching the technological frontier and
consequently ceteris paribus finds it more difficult to substitute currently
used techniques of productions with more efficient ones.7
To actual obtain these results it has been necessary to develop an algo-
rithm that in an effective way computes these frontiers. The mathematical
notion of an envelope is conceptual straightforward, but the natural brute
force algorithm associated with the computation of such an envelope is for
every single point computational infeasible. This problem and the algorithm
developed to solve it is fully described in Section 5, but can be skipped by
readers more interested in the empirical results.
Section 2 presents the theoretical framework, Section 3 the indices used,
Section 4 the data, and Section 6 the empirical results. Section 7 concludes
the paper.
2 The Technological Frontier
The economic system consists of n industries each producing one unique
commodity by means of some combination of the n commodities and labour.8
Let A be a n × n indecomposable semi-positive non-singular matrix of
interindustry coefficients, where the ijth entry represents the ith industry’s
use of the jth commodity in the production of one unit of the industry’s
output. Likewise, l is a n × 1 vector of labour input coefficients where the
ith entry represents the ith industry’s use of labour in the production of one
unit of output. As usual these elements can be collected in the following
long-run equilibrium relationship that captures the distribution of the total
production among wages, profits, and means of production, where the wage
and profit rates are assumed to be uniform:
Ap(1 + r) + lw = p (2.1)
6See among many Abramovitz (1986).
7See Ernst et. al. (1998, p. 15–16), where the the access to technology constraint is
discussed in relation to Korea and Taiwan in the 1980s and 1990s.
8This theoretical part is based on the seminal work by von Neumann (1945–46), Leon-
tief (1941), and Sraffa (1960), and subsequent work found in Pasinetti (1977), Velupillai
and Zambelli (1993), and Zambelli (2004).
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Choosing a numéraire η, for which it holds that η′p = 1, the degrees of
freedom reduces from two to one, such that for a given rate of profit, the
wage rate can be computed by isolating p(r,A, l) =
(
I − A(1 + r)
)−1
lw,
premultiplying with the numéraire, and rearranging, viz.
w(r,A, l) =
(
η′
(
I −A(1 + r)
)−1
l
)−1
r = {r ∈ Q : 0 ≤ r ≤ R} (2.2)
Where R, the maximum rate of profit, can be computed as R = λ−1 − 1,
where again λ is the maximum eigenvalue of A.
It must be stressed that the production prices p(r,A, l) and the wage
rate w(r,A, l) are scale-independent, not only of the scale of the economy
6
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Fig. 2.1: The technological frontier
as a whole, but also the scale of production in the single industries. This
property is known as the Non-Substitution Theorem.9
For each unique set of techniques
{
E(k)
}
=
{
A(k), l(k)
}
, k = 1, 2, ...,m,
from the set of systems E =
{
E(1), E(2), ..., E(m)
}
there is a unique wage-
profit frontier. The envelope of these frontiers, illustrated in Figure 2.1, is
the technological frontier, viz.
wTF(r,E) = max
{
w(r, E(1)), w(r, E(2)), ..., w(r, E(m))
}
(2.3)
As defined in the introduction we study three versions of the technological
frontier; the contemporary wCTFt (r,Et), the rolling w
RTF
t (r,E1, E2, ...,Et),
and the intertemporal wITF(r,E), where Et denotes the set of techniques
used at time t and E the total set of techniques. An obvious analytical
property of these three versions of the technological frontier is that:10
wCTFt (r,Et) ≤ wRTFt (r,E1,E2, ...,Et) ≤ wITF(r,E) ∀ t = 1, 2, ..., T (2.4)
9See Kurz and Salvadori (1995, p. 26–28) for a discussion of the origin and implications
of this peculiar result.
10Since {Et} ⊆ {E1, E2, ..., Et} ⊆ {E} ∀ t = 1, 2, ..., T
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For convenience and completeness we restate the analytical properties asso-
ciated with the technological frontier. For proofs and further discussion of
these properties, see Pasinetti (1977 p. 158–59).
1. At the switch point between two techniques, each commodity has the same
price.
2. If, for a given rate of profit, one technique dominates another, then it will
yield prices, in terms of the wage rate, that are strictly lower than those
yielded by the other technique.
3. The switch points are independent of the choice of numéraire.
4. The technological frontier is strictly decreasing as the rate of profit increases.
5. (Corollary) At the switch points between two techniques, the change will
occur in one, and only one, industry, i.e., piecemeal.
For the purpose of computing and interpreting the technological frontier,
property number three is very convenient, since it implies that the set of
technologies forming the technological frontier is independent of the choice
of numéraire. Since an objective of this study is to construct indices for
comparative studies it is imperative that these indices are (more or less)
independent of the numéraire chosen to compute it. However, while the
set of techniques constituting the technological frontier is independent of
the choice of numéraire, the shape of the frontier is not. Consequently,
the choice of numéraire will to some extent influence our results, but the
influence will be suppressed by the stability of the switch points. In the
analysis, the number of switch points on the envelopes will be reported to
provide a first approximation of the robustness of our results.
Furthermore, as will be clear later, property number five turns out, from
a computational point of view, to be extremely convenient.
3 The Velupillai-Fredholm-Zambelli Index
The technological frontier can be interpreted as an access to technology con-
straint, since it provides a proxy for the maximum potential level of pro-
ductivity. The technological frontier allows us to reformulated, in a more
general terms, the well known catching up hypothesis, i.e., that the growth
rate in productivity varies inversely with the productivity level. Replacing
the US (the leader) with the intertemporal technological frontier, allows us
to study the same problems, but with a benchmark extracted from the en-
tire sample. Furthermore, we are now able to address the question ’is the
US catching up?’ Why should the US not be able to catch up to something
more efficient already potentially available in the system, defined by the
technological frontier? Naturally, this also provides a convenient framework
in which to study overtaking, i.e., if one country should overtake the leader.
To study this and more, we construct what we shall call the country
specific Velupillai-Fredholm-Zambelli (VFZ) index that provides a measure
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of the average efficiency relative to the intertemporal technological frontier.
For the jth country at time t the VFZ-index is computed as.
V FZj,t = 1−
1
Rj,t
Rj,t∑
r=0
[
wITF
(
r,E
)
− w
(
r,Aj,t, lj,t
)]
(3.1)
j = 1, 2, ..., N, t = 1, 2, ..., T
In words, the VFZ-index is computed as one minus the average vertical
distance between the individual countries wage-profit frontiers and the in-
tertemporal 1970–2005 technological frontier. The range of the index is be-
tween zero and one. The closer the index is to unity the more efficient is the
technology used in the single country relative to the theoretical maximum
computed from the entire set of production activities.11
An analogue global version of the VFZ-index is computed from the ver-
tical distances between the contemporary technological frontiers and the
intertemporal technological frontier, viz.
V FZglobalt = 1−
1
RCTFt
RCTFt∑
r=0
[
wITF
(
r,E
)
− wCTFt
(
r,Et
)]
(3.2)
t = 1, 2, ..., T (3.3)
Where RCTFt is the maximum profit rate associated with the contemporary
technological frontier at time t. The global VFZ-index provides a measure
of the technological progress for the global economy as a whole.
The advantages of the VFZ-indices over conventional ones are:
1. The method is non-parametric and non-stochastic.
2. Technology, value, and aggregation are fully integrated through the
prices of production, hence to some extend circumvents standard index
number and value problems.
3. The indices are time-invariant, i.e., they are fully determined within
single accounting period.12
4. The stability of the switch points greatly limits the sensitivity of
changes in the numéraire.
5. The interdependence among industries is endogenously captured by
changes in the prices of production.
11An alternative index could be computed using some proxy for the actual distribution
among wages and profits. Hence, using only one point on (or a segment of) each frontier.
12However, updating the entire dataset with new data, say the 2010 OECD tables, will
almost certainly change the intertemporal technological frontier, but the within-period
ranking will remain unaffected.
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6. The indices will not change as a consequence of simple changes in the
scale of production in the single industries, but only if real technolog-
ical innovations are observed in one or more industries.13
7. In the study of convergence, the benchmark/reference point is deter-
mined from the system as a whole and not simple a ’leading country’.
4 Data and the Choice of Numéraire
For the actual computation of the technological frontiers we have chosen
the OECD 1970–2005 input–output tables from the US, Germany, the UK,
France, Canada, Denmark, Japan, and Australia. All based on the the ISIC
2 or ISIC 3 classifications with respectively 35 and 48 industries.14 The
tables contain both the domestic interindustrial flow and industry-specific
imports of capital goods.
Some problems of comparability exist between the two methods of clas-
sification, but steps have been taken to minimize these problems. The initial
48 and 35 industries have been aggregated into 23 industries following stan-
dards of national accounting. The main reason for so doing is that it ensures
comparability over time and non-singular matrices for the whole dataset.
Unfortunately, tables are not available for all countries for all time pe-
riods. To further increase comparability we have chosen to substitute the
missing tables with the most commensurable table, typically the table from
the previous accounting period in the same country. For details, see Table
A.1 in Appendix A.
As labour inputs we use data from the OECD on the industry-level ’com-
pensation of employees’ and use this to distribute the total employment in
hours to the single industries. When available we use detailed industry-level
employment data from The Groningen Growth and Development Centre.15
Note, that both over time and across industries labour is treated as a ho-
mogeneous input. This is a very strong assumption, but necessary given the
data availability.
There is a fundamental problem related to the units of accounting,
since the tables are denominated in current values of the national currency.
Macro-industry deflators have been computed as the differences between
macro-industry GDP denomination in respectively current and base period
prices, and used to deflate the value denominated tables. This is proba-
bly the best available proxy for the physical flow among industries found in
the OECD input–output tables. For a discussion on monetary vs. physi-
cal denominated input–output data, see Han and Schefold (2006, p. 750).
13By real technological innovations we mean changes in the matrix of technological
coefficients and/or in the corresponding (normalised) vector of labour inputs.
14See www.OECD.org.
15See www.GGDC.net.
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Appendix A contains additional information on the data used.
As a numéraire we choose the vector of domestic net products from the
base year 2000 normalised with the total hours worked. We use the domestic
net products, because if imported means of production were subtracted we
would not necessarily obtain a vector of non-negative entries. Section 6.4
discusses the relationship between the choice of numéraire and the stability
of our results based on the number of switch points on the envelopes.
5 Algorithms
Formally speaking, the problem of computing a technological frontier is
computable, i.e., there exist an algorithmic procedure that in a finite number
of steps can compute it, or equivalent under the Church-Turing thesis there
exists a Turing-machine that always halts.16 The formal proof of this is
given in terms of the following brute-force algorithm.
5.1 A brute-force algorithm
1. import data and convert the data into matrices of technical coefficients
2. loop through all possible systems, k = 1 : 1 : Nn
(a) compute the maximum eigenvalue λ(k) for the kth system
3. use the minimum λ(k) to compute R associated with the technological fron-
tier
4. loop through all possible systems
(a) compute the wage rate for incremental steps of 0 < r < R
5. for each r select the system associated with the maximum wage rate
However, when using the above algorithm the computational complexity of
the problem implies that it is practical impossible to compute the technolog-
ical frontier for even small datasets, since for each rate of profit all possible
combinations of techniques must be evaluated. Using the Big-O notation
the time-complexity is (at least) O(Nn). This implies that no matter how
powerful a computer that will be developed within, say the next century, it
will always be possible to include addition available data, such that the al-
gorithm will not halt within any reasonable time frame.17 What makes this
16Note that the domain of the technological frontier, see Equation 2.2 and 2.3, has been
defined on the rational line.
17A back-on-the-envelope (!) estimate of the computer power needed to compute the
intertemporal technological frontier based on (T · N)n = (8 · 8)23 ≈ 3.5 · 1041 unique
systems; for just one rate of profit, running a whole year, the computer must evaluate
1.1 ·1034 systems per second, each including several matrix operations. Not anything near
such a computer exists today or will within any reasonable time frame.
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problem serious for even rather small values of N and n, is that the algo-
rithmic procedures must contain computations of eigenvalues and inversions
of n× n matrices.
The computational complexity can however be drastically reduced (in
the order of Nn to N · n) by exploiting property number five listed in Sec-
tion 2. Using any point on any frontier the following procedure, so to say,
climbs the individual wage-profit frontiers using the switch points as step-
ping stones.
5.2 The Piecemeal algorithm
1. import data and convert it into matrices of technical coefficients
2. choose an initial point on any frontier
3. from this point, while r > 0, lower the profit rate one increment18 and
compute the wage rate without changing the techniques, save this as w
(a) one by one, change the techniques (piecemeal), i.e., n · (N − 1) times,
and for each system
i. if the profit rate is smaller than the maximum profit rate, compute
the wage rates
ii. if this wage rate is greater than w, then we have passed a switch
point. Fix the new set of techniques and the associated wage rate.
Else use w
4. Now reverse the procedure, while w > 0, increase the profit rate one incre-
ment and compute the wage rate without changing the techniques, save this
as w
(a) one by one, change the techniques and for each system:
i. if the profit rate is smaller than the maximum profit rate, compute
the wage rates.
ii. if this wage rate is greater than w, then we have passed a switch
point. Fix the new set of techniques and the associated wage rate.
Else use w
5. go to point # 3 as long as loop # 3 and 4 do not produce identical results,
else terminate and collect the results
Both algorithms can be implemented with no serious demand for the avail-
able memory, but unlike the brute-force algorithm the Piecemeal algorithm
cannot be run parallel.
An easy way to verify the outcome from the Piecemeal algorithm is to
apply the two algorithms on a tractable subset and check that they yield
identical results. This has been done with positive results.19
18In the actual computation the stepsize is fixed at 1
1000
. Between 1
500
and 1
1000
the
number of switch point increased, which implies that the algorithm missed some switch
points. No changes in the results are found when narrowing the stepsize to 1
2000
.
19There exist one potential problem; it is theoretical possible, by some fluke, that the
envelope is not connected by intersections with the initially chosen frontier. However, the
probability of this occurring tends to zero as the number of techniques tends to infinity.
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The full set of results based on the eight OECD countries for eight time
periods can be computed within a few hours, with the Piecemeal algorithm
using a standard desktop computer.
6 Efficiency, Technological Change, and Conver-
gence
This analysis is both from a theoretical and empirical point of view ’av-
erage’, as oppose to ’marginal’, since it deals with average costs, returns,
revenues, etc. while mainstream (marginal) theory focus on the correspond-
ing marginal magnitudes. Given that marginal magnitudes can never be
observed, but average magnitudes can, this is the appropriate approach to
empirical studies. However, in one case where the orthodox theory is aver-
age, this approach is specific; we do not assume a representative firm.
A general problem associated with the measurement of technological
progress is related to the fact that different production activities use different
sets of factors of production. For example one can consider the production
of energy; nuclear energy, wind mills, hydro-power, solar-energy, oil, coal,
gas, etc. It would be rather difficult to asses which production process that
is most efficient. Moreover, it is not always the case that the adoption of a
new method indicates that the method is superior. There might be other
reasons different from technological superiority, and the expected costs could
differ from from the actual costs.
The economic system as a whole most likely adopts a combination of the
different methods of production. Consequently, the observed output from
an industry and the corresponding vectors of industry inputs are not only
average over the accounting period (as it should be), but also average across
the techniques used. However, this problem should diminish as the number
of industries in the national accounting increases.
6.1 The empirical technological frontiers
Figure 6.1 shows the complete collection of contemporary and rolling tech-
nological frontiers. Analogue to the study of the wage-profit frontiers for the
individual countries, an outward shift of the frontier implies unambiguously
technological progress. If two frontiers intersect, it cannot unambiguously
be determined whether of not a higher level of productivity is reached.
The contemporary technological frontiers show a clockwise and steady
shift outwards, while the rolling technological frontiers show a more parallel
shift. This difference provides a first-hand insight into the nature of the
global technological progress. But however tempting as it might be, it is
not unambiguous, to interpret the shifts of the contemporary technological
frontiers as a global labour-saving technological progress, since the value
12
of the circulating capital not necessarily changes monotonic with the profit
rate.
The problem of intersection(s) between frontiers does however not exist
for the rolling technological frontier, since these by construction will never
intersect. Consequently, together with the other frontiers, this property
makes the rolling technological frontier a strong analytical tool. An observed
Fig. 6.1: The contemporary and rolling and technological fron-
tiers
difference between the contemporary and rolling frontiers implies that there
exist some combinations of the old and new production techniques, which
are more productive than all combinations of the techniques currently used.
However, it could be argued that some old techniques of production
should be discarded from the set of techniques forming the rolling (and
intertemporal) technological frontier. This could be techniques that are
both (under some circumstances) superior to contemporary techniques, but
practical obsolete, e.g., because of severe negative externalities or depletions
of raw materials. And hence de facto no longer exist in the book of available
blueprints.
Figure 6.2 and 6.3 show the wage-profit frontiers for the individual coun-
tries together with the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers. Fig-
ure 6.2 for the period 1970–1985 and Figure 6.3 for 1990–2005. As expected
the US is from the 1970s the leading country, but the US wage-profit fron-
tiers do not shift as much as the other countries’ frontiers in the 1970s, i.e.,
evidence of a slowdown in the US and catching up by the other countries.20
20See Degasperi and Fredholm (2010) for a discussion of the US productivity slowdown.
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Fig. 6.2: Wage-profit, contemporary, and intertemporal tech-
nological frontiers: 1970–1985
Fig. 6.3: Wage-profit, contemporary, and intertemporal tech-
nological frontiers: 1990–2005
14
See also Figure B.2 and B.3 in the statistical companion, where the frontiers
are presented country-by-country.
6.2 The Velupillai-Fredholm-Zambelli index
The Fredholm-Zambelli-Velupillai index computed for the eight countries
and the economy as a whole is collected in Figure 6.4 and Table 6.1. The
global VFZ-index tells a story of stepwise technological development for the
economy as a whole. During the 1970s the index stayed at a fairly stable
level about 40–45 percent of the intertemporal maximum represented by the
intertemporal technological frontier. From the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s
Fig. 6.4: The Velupillai-Fredholm-Zambelli index
the global productivity level stabilised at a new level about 55 percent, and
finally in 2000 and 2005 reached a level close to 65 percent.21
It is surprising that over a period of 35 years the global VFZ-index has
only increased from 0.45 to 0.66. This corresponds to a compounded growth
rate at 1.1 percent per year, which is far less than the often reported 1.5–2
percent. Over a period of 35 years the difference between a growth rate
of 1.1 and 2.0 percent corresponds to an increase of a factor 1.5 and 2,
respectively.
For the single countries the difference between the level of 1970 and 2005
corresponds to a compounded growth rate of; the US 1.0, Germany 1.2, the
UK 2.0, France 1.2, Canada 1.5, Denmark 1.4, Japan 8.1, and Australia 2.1
percent per year. As with the global index these growth rates are, except
21Of course much more could be said, if data had been available at a yearly basis, and
the stepwise technological development must to some extent a consequence of the five year
intervals.
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for Japan, surprisingly small. Especially, the 1.0 percent annual growth for
US.
If these results are—as implicitly claimed—more reliable than the usual
indices of technological progress, then the results are indeed interesting. In
particular, since technological progress determines the limit for a sustain-
able increase in the standard of living. Sustainable as oppose to the extreme
increases in asset prices and consumption preceding the current economic
turmoil. Reliable indices of technological change, determined from the phys-
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
the US
Germany
the UK
France
Canada
Denmark
Japan
Australia
global
0.35 0.34 0.34 0.38 0.40 0.39 0.40 0.50
0.26 0.24 0.24 0.27 0.28 0.39 0.39 0.40
0.16 0.21 0.21 0.24 0.24 0.28 0.30 0.32
0.26 0.25 0.27 0.34 0.42 0.40 0.41 0.39
0.21 0.22 0.21 0.24 0.24 0.29 0.36 0.35
0.21 0.20 0.18 0.24 0.31 0.40 0.42 0.34
0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.32 0.22 0.31
0.14 0.19 0.19 0.23 0.30 0.30 0.28 0.29
0.45 0.48 0.47 0.55 0.57 0.56 0.64 0.66
Table 6.1: The Velupillai-Fredholm-Zambelli index
ical flow among industries, could prove instrumental to better assess the
technological constraints for our long-run standard of living.22
Apart from the differences in levels, the evolution in the global index
is partly mimicked by the US index which also evolves in uneven steps.
The difference between the US index and the global index increased slightly
over the period considered with a large spike around 2000. It is here worth
noting, that the global index from 1995 to 2000 increased from 56 to 64
percent while the US index only increased with one basis point. Hence, it is
unlikely that it was the US that was driving the global development in the
late 1990s. More will be said on this in Section 6.3, where the analysis is
carried to the industry level.
Another interesting point is that the US is not facing an impending
access to technology constraint. Naturally, this depends on the availability
of the foreign production techniques. Some techniques might be country-
specific, i.e, cannot be transferred; a great deal will probably not be ’public
goods’, but internal to multinational corporations, which at least limits the
transferability; and some (if not most) production techniques require a great
deal of human capital which in one way or another also must be transferred.
In any case, we observe that the US from the 1980s has been approaching
22As oppose to some, however deflated, market price denominated proxy for (net) output
per unit of labour. Not to mention indices build on an ad hoc and partly stochastic measure
of fixed capital (aka the perpetual inventory method).
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the intertemporal technological frontier, but also that there still potentially
is a long way to go.23
The other countries, apart from Japan, show a more steady technolog-
ical development, with a slow convergence towards both the US and the
intertemporal frontier. In 1990, France actually reached the level of the US
which it maintained until the US took off between 2000 and 2005. The same
Fig. 6.5: Index of ’total hours worked’, 1970 = index 1.
(Source: Official OECD employment data)
goes for Germany and Denmark from 1995, while the UK and Australia re-
mained behind.
Japan is showing an extraordinary development, until 1990 it is far be-
hind all the other countries, but around 1995 Japan attained the level of
the UK, Canada, and Australia. Without going into details, part of the
explanation is probably found in the deregulations between 1990 and 1995
and subsequent drastic decrease in ’total hours worked’ as shown in Figure
6.5.24
Figure 6.5 shows a very uneven development in the total hours worked.
The US, Canada, and Australia show steady increases in the total hours
worked (much of which is likely a consequence of immigration), while the
European countries show a relatively stable or slightly decreasing develop-
ment. Japan is the odd one out, it increased steadily during the 1970s and
1980s, where after it decreased with an average annual rate corresponding
to about 0.8 percent between 1990 and 2005. Furthermore, Japan is the
23When the next set of OECD tables are published, will this increase the intertemporal
frontier more than the US wage-profit frontier?
24For details on the deregulation initiatives in Japan in the 1990, see the homepage of
The Japan Institute of Labour and Training, www.jil.go.jp.
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only country where there is no apparent periodic business cycle to be found
in the employment data.25
Combining our surprising result of the 1.0 percent US year-to-year in-
crease in our measure of technological progress between 1970 and 2005 with
the aggregate employment data reported in Figure 6.5, points towards an
economic development in the US driving more by increased work effort than
increased productivity. Between 1970 and 2005 the US employment mea-
sured in hours increased by a factor 1.6 corresponding to a yearly increase
of about 1.4 percent.
Going into the causes behind the convergence in productivity levels lie
outside the scope of the paper. As concluded by Abramovitz (1986, p. 405):
differences among countries in productivity levels create a
strong potentiality for subsequent convergence of levels, provided
that countries have a ”social capability” adequate to absorb more
advanced technologies. [However,] the institutional and human
capital components of social capability develop only slowly as
education and organization respond to the requirements of tech-
nological opportunity and to experience in exploiting it.
Hence, we might be able to observe the actual effects from the processes of
catching up, but the deep causes explaining country-specific differences must
be understood in terms of social and institutional characteristics. However,
it is possible to venture a step deeper into a descriptive study of the country-
specific development, viz. the industry-level development.
6.3 Industry-level development
Figure 6.6 shows the (unweighted) average industry-level frequency of the
single countries contribution to the contemporary and rolling technological
frontiers.
Even though the US is considered the leading country, it is only in few
cases the country that is contributing most to the technological frontiers
(including the intertemporal which is the rightmost of the rolling frontiers).
This indicates that the US in a few industries strongly dominates, i.e., all
or most segments of the envelope include a particular US technique, and
that these industries must play a vital role for the economy as a whole. By
inspecting Figures B.4–B.26 for the single industries in the statistical com-
panion, it is found that the US dominates in ’Construction’; ’Machinery and
equipment, nec’; and ’Business activities (finance, real estate, and R&D)’.
25However, it must be noted that between 1990 and 1995 the input–output tables change
from the ISIC 2 to the present ISIC 3 standard of accounting. Whether or not this greatly
influence our results is pro tempore unknown.
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Together with Germany the US also dominates in ’Manufacturing, nec’. Ger-
many dominates in ’Electrical machinery and apparatus’; ’Transport equip-
ment’; and ’Manufacturing nec; recycling (include Furniture)’. Canada in
Fig. 6.6: The composition of the contemporary and rolling tech-
nological frontiers
’Other non-metallic mineral products’; ’Metals’; ’Fabricated metal products,
except machinery and equipment’. Denmark, however insignificant on the
world marked, dominates in ’Mining and quarrying’ and ’Food products,
beverages, and tobacco’.
In many cases, about 30–40 percent of the production techniques en-
tering the envelopes are Canadian. This is surprising given that Canada,
measured by, e.g., the VFZ-index, does not rank as one of the most produc-
tive countries.
An important general point is that no country at a single point in time
dominates the entire technological frontier (contemporary or rolling). Hence,
all countries could, at any point in time, potentially gain from further global
integration, either through increased trade or transfer of production tech-
niques (including human capital).
The statistical companion contains detailed empirical evidence on the
country/industry specific contributions to the different technological fron-
tiers. From these results it is possible to go deeper into an analysis of the
displacement of the production techniques over time. In particular, it would
be interesting to study the difference between the displacement of techniques
in the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers, since this can tell
us to what extent new more productive techniques have been introduced as
oppose to new combinations of old techniques of production.
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6.4 The number of switch points
Since the switch points on the envelopes are independent of the choice of
numéraire a large number of switch points would imply that our results
would be relatively unaffected by the choice of numéraire.
For the contemporary frontiers the number of switch points starting with
the 1970 frontier are 25, 22, 22, 21, 22, 25, 26, and 31, and for the rolling
frontiers 25, 36, 44, 46, 42, 44, 53, and 49. It is assessed that the number of
switch points in general is of a magnitude, that ensures a fairly numéraire
independent envelope. The intuition behind this conclusion follows directly
from the properties listed in Section 2. If the numéraire is changed the sub-
sequent results must also change, but a strictly decreasing envelope, together
with 20 to 50 fixed points, do not leave much room for disturbance.
In hindsight not surprising, is the fact that the number of switch points
tends to increase with the number of techniques on which the envelope is
computed. For the contemporary frontiers the number of unique systems is
823 and for the rolling it increase as 823, 1623, 2423, ..., 6423.
For the record, no reverse capital deepening or reswitching are found on
any of the technological frontiers computed for this study.26
7 Concluding Remarks
The value-added of this paper is two-fold. First, an algorithm, the Piece-
meal algorithm, has been developed that is capable of computing actual
technological frontiers from huge collections of production techniques. The
algorithm computes the entire technological frontier, the envelope, without
going through partial or stochastic ad hoc short cuts.
Second, by exploiting the power the Piecemeal algorithm three different
versions of the technological frontier have been computed and analysed; the
contemporary, the rolling, and the intertemporal. From these frontiers a set
of indices, the VFZ-indices, has been extracted to provide global as well as
country-specific condensed measures of technological progress.
The global VFZ-index, computed from the contemporary technological
frontiers and intertemporal technological frontier, provides a measure of the
technological progress for the global economy as a whole. The index based
on the eight OECD countries tells a story of a stepwise technological devel-
opment, with major jumps in the periods 1980–1985 and 1995–2000. But
also a global development that shows a more moderate rate of productivity
growth compared with the conventional stylized facts of a 1.5–2.0 percent
year-to-year increase. The global VFZ-index increased from 0.45 in 1970 to
0.66 in 2005, i.e., an increase of a factor 1.5 against the factor 2 implied by
a 2.0 percent per year compounded growth over 35 years.
26See Han and Schefold (2006).
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The VFZ-indices for the single countries, constructed from the individual
countries’ wage-profit frontiers and the intertemporal technological frontier,
have provided new insight into the country-specific technological progress
and convergence. Among the results are evidence of an economic develop-
ment in the US driven at least as much by an increased work effort as an
increased productivity.
Furthermore, by identifying which production techniques that enter the
different technological frontiers, we have carried out a preliminary analysis
of the country/industry specific contributions to the overall development. It
has been shown that even though the US is the leading country, it is only
in few cases the US that is contributing most to the technological frontiers.
The few industries where the US strongly dominates on the technological
frontiers are ’Construction’; ’Machinery and equipment, nec’; and ’Business
activities (finance, real estate, and R&D)’. Moreover, we see that no country
at any point in time dominates anything near an entire technological fron-
tier, i.e., the potential gains from further global integration have not been
exhausted for any country at any point in time.
Common for these frontiers and the indices based hereupon is a con-
siderable resilience to the theoretical problems that hitherto have haunted
the construction of index numbers and thereby any form of productivity ac-
counting. In particular, the technological frontiers and the associated indices
are; non-parametric and non-stochastic; the interdependence among indus-
tries is endogenously captured by changes in the prices of production; and
will not change as a consequence of simple changes in the scale of production
in the single industries.
While the envelope is numéraire dependent, the stability provided by the
20–50 switch points greatly limits the sensitivity to changes in the numéraire.
A huge work remains to be carried out going deeper into an analysis
of the displacement of the production techniques on the contemporary and
rolling technological frontiers.
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A Data Description
Table A.1 shows which OECD input–output tables that are available from
the period 1970–2005. Tables are not necessarily available from the exact five
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
the US
Germany
the UK
France
Canada
Denmark
Japan
Australia
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
Table A.1: Available input–output tables
year intervals, e.g., the US tables here labelled 1970 and 1975 are actually
the 1972 and 1977 tables, respectively.27
The list below shows how the original tables have been aggregated down
to the 23× 23 used in this study. The numbers in the brackets refer to their
respective ISIC 2 and ISIC 3 classification, viz. {[ISIC 3],[ISIC 2]}.
1. Agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing {[1],[1]}
2. Mining and quarrying {[2–3],[2]}
3. Food products, beverages, and tobacco {[4],[3]}
4. Textiles, textile products, leather, and footwear {[5],[4]}
5. Wood and products of wood and cork {[6],[5]}
6. Pulp, paper, paper products, printing, and publishing {[7],[6]}
7. Coke, refined petroleum products, and nuclear fuel {[8],[9]}
8. Chemicals {[9–10],[7–8]}
9. Rubber and plastics products {[11],[10]}
10. Other non-metallic mineral products {[12],[11]}
11. Metals {[13–14],[12–13]}
12. Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment {[15],[14]}
13. Machinery and equipment, nec {[16],[15]}
14. Electrical machinery and apparatus {[17–20],[16–18]}
15. Transport equipment {[21–25],[19–22]}
16. Manufacturing nec; recycling (include furniture) {[25],[23–24]}
17. Production and distribution of electricity, gas, and water {[26–29],[25]}
18. Construction {[30],[26]}
19. Wholesale and retail trade {[31],[27]}
20. Service activities (transport, hotels and restaurants) {[32–36],[28–29]}
21. Post and telecommunications {[37],[30]}
22. Business activities (finance, real estate, and R&D) {[38–43],[31–32]}
23. Public administration, education and health {[44–48],[33–35]}
27The full list of available tables are: the US {1972, 1977, 1982, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000,
2005}, Germany {1978, 1986, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005}, the UK {1968, 1979, 1984, 1990,
1995, 2000, 2003}, France {1977, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005}, Canada {1971,
1976, 1981, 1986, 1990, 1995, 2000}, Denmark {1977, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2004},
Japan {1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005}, and Australia {1968, 1974, 1986,
1989, 1999 ,2005}.
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Table A.2–A.9 show the macro-industry deflators used to convert the ta-
bles denominated in current prices (possible domestic currency) into tables
denominated in fixed US 2000 prices. The transition to the EURO has
been taken into account in the tables below. The deflators are computed as
the ratio between GDP in constant prices and GDP in current prices and
when necessary also divided by the dollar-domestic currency exchange rate
(www.sourceoecd.org). The missing values marked with a ’−’ correspond
with the unavailable OECD tables.
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
I Agriculture, hunting
and forestry; fishing
II Industry
including energy
III Construction
IV Wholesale and retail
trade, repairs; hotels and
restaurants; transport
V Financial intermediation;
real estate, business activities
VI Other service activities
1.23 0.84 0.71 0.74 0.65 0.67 1.00 0.91
2.83 1.89 1.14 1.09 1.02 0.96 1.00 0.93
4.97 3.28 2.03 1.79 1.43 1.26 1.00 0.71
2.13 1.53 1.12 1.05 0.97 0.87 1.00 0.98
4.79 3.45 2.34 1.88 1.47 1.23 1.00 0.88
5.15 3.57 2.37 1.98 1.53 1.24 1.00 0.82
Table A.2: Macro-industry deflators for the US 1970–2005
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
I Agriculture, hunting
and forestry; fishing
II Industry
including energy
III Construction
IV Wholesale and retail
trade, repairs; hotels and
restaurants; transport
V Financial intermediation;
real estate, business activities
VI Other service activities
− − 0.53 0.60 0.64 1.00 1.03 1.39
− − 0.81 0.60 0.57 1.02 1.03 1.01
− − 1.15 0.84 0.71 1.02 1.03 0.98
− − 0.78 0.63 0.60 1.01 1.03 1.03
− − 1.01 0.69 0.61 1.02 1.03 0.94
− − 0.98 0.75 0.67 1.08 1.03 0.97
Table A.3: Macro-industry deflators for Germany 1970–2005
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
I Agriculture, hunting
and forestry; fishing
II Industry
including energy
III Construction
IV Wholesale and retail
trade, repairs; hotels and
restaurants; transport
V Financial intermediation;
real estate, business activities
VI Other service activities
5.97 − 2.26 2.43 1.40 1.06 1.57 1.37
11.3 − 3.65 2.21 1.86 1.64 1.57 1.57
18.4 − 4.44 3.14 2.15 2.00 1.57 1.35
13.2 − 4.41 2.87 1.91 1.72 1.57 1.51
14.8 − 4.50 2.87 2.01 1.71 1.57 1.34
21.5 − 5.81 3.84 2.33 1.94 1.57 1.38
Table A.4: Macro-industry deflators for the UK 1970–2005
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1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
I Agriculture, hunting
and forestry; fishing
II Industry
including energy
III Construction
IV Wholesale and retail
trade, repairs; hotels and
restaurants; transport
V Financial intermediation;
real estate, business activities
VI Other service activities
− 0.25 0.23 0.17 0.15 0.98 1.06 1.09
− 0.34 0.26 0.17 0.16 1.04 1.06 1.12
− 0.56 0.38 0.26 0.21 1.19 1.06 0.86
− 0.39 0.30 0.20 0.17 1.05 1.06 0.95
− 0.53 0.42 0.29 0.22 1.22 1.06 0.94
− 0.58 0.41 0.26 0.21 1.18 1.06 0.91
Table A.5: Macro-industry deflators for France 1970–2005
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
I Agriculture, hunting
and forestry; fishing
II Industry
including energy
III Construction
IV Wholesale and retail
trade, repairs; hotels and
restaurants; transport
V Financial intermediation;
real estate, business activities
VI Other service activities
3.53 1.63 1.00 0.96 0.95 0.78 0.81 −
3.95 2.37 1.38 1.18 1.04 0.94 0.81 −
3.33 1.89 1.31 1.18 0.92 0.87 0.81 −
2.63 1.76 1.20 0.96 0.85 0.82 0.81 −
4.26 2.50 1.58 1.17 0.94 0.87 0.81 −
4.40 2.58 1.71 1.29 1.02 0.90 0.81 −
Table A.6: Macro-industry deflators for Canada 1970–2005
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
I Agriculture, hunting
and forestry; fishing
II Industry
including energy
III Construction
IV Wholesale and retail
trade, repairs; hotels and
restaurants; transport
V Financial intermediation;
real estate, business activities
VI Other service activities
− .104 .094 .074 .078 .101 .119 .143
− .305 .246 .178 .149 .140 .119 .113
− .360 .290 .222 .173 .147 .119 .104
− .244 .210 .134 .120 .117 .119 .109
− .329 .253 .179 .150 .128 .119 .109
− .360 .285 .197 .151 .136 .119 .103
Table A.7: Macro-industry deflators for Denmark 1970–2005
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
I Agriculture, hunting
and forestry; fishing
II Industry
including energy
III Construction
IV Wholesale and retail
trade, repairs; hotels and
restaurants; transport
V Financial intermediation;
real estate, business activities
VI Other service activities
.0135 .0083 .0067 .0063 .0060 .0056 .0065 .0071
.0111 .0078 .0063 .0058 .0058 .0059 .0065 .0074
.0313 .0152 .0104 .0087 .0073 .0066 .0065 .0066
.0123 .0082 .0067 .0062 .0062 .0061 .0065 .0068
.0177 .0119 .0091 .0078 .0069 .0064 .0065 .0068
.0288 .0137 .0104 .0086 .0075 .0066 .0065 .0067
Table A.8: Macro-industry deflators for Japan 1970–2005
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
I Agriculture, hunting
and forestry; fishing
II Industry
including energy
III Construction
IV Wholesale and retail
trade, repairs; hotels and
restaurants; transport
V Financial intermediation;
real estate, business activities
VI Other service activities
3.32 2.09 − 0.98 0.73 − 0.88 0.75
3.78 2.76 − 0.94 0.88 − 0.80 0.55
4.45 2.72 − 1.05 0.88 − 0.77 0.65
5.35 3.42 − 1.02 0.84 − 0.77 0.69
7.30 4.98 − 1.34 0.99 − 0.80 0.65
5.04 2.96 − 1.20 1.01 − 0.79 0.61
Table A.9: Macro-industry deflators for Australia 1970–2005
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B Additional Results
B.1 The Wage-profit and Intertemporal Technological Fron-
tiers
Figure B.1 shows the wage-profit frontiers forming the intertemporal tech-
nological frontier, and Figure B.2 and B.3 show the wage-profit frontiers
for the individual countries together with the intertemporal technological
frontier.
Fig. B.1: The intertemporal technological frontier
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Fig. B.2: Wage-profit frontiers and the intertemporal techno-
logical frontier: the US, Germany, the UK, and
France
Fig. B.3: Wage-profit frontiers and the intertemporal techno-
logical frontier: Canada, Denmark, Japan, and Aus-
tralia
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B.2 Industrylevel Frequency of the Single Countries Contri-
bution to the Contemporary Technological Frontiers
The following 23 figures show the industry-level frequency of the single coun-
tries contribution to the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers.
Fig. B.4: Countries and industry specific contributions to
the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers,
Agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing
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Fig. B.5: Countries and industry specific contributions to
the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers,
Mining and quarrying
Fig. B.6: Countries and industry specific contributions to
the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers,
Food products, beverages, and tobacco
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Fig. B.7: Countries and industry specific contributions to the
contemporary and rolling technological frontiers, Tex-
tiles, textile products, leather, and footwear
Fig. B.8: Countries and industry specific contributions to
the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers,
Wood and products of wood and cork
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Fig. B.9: Countries and industry specific contributions to
the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers,
Pulp, paper, paper products, printing, and publishing
Fig. B.10: Countries and industry specific contributions to
the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers,
Coke, refined petroleum products, and nuclear fuel
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Fig. B.11: Countries and industry specific contributions to
the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers,
Chemicals
Fig. B.12: Countries and industry specific contributions to
the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers,
Rubber and plastics products
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Fig. B.13: Countries and industry specific contributions to
the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers,
Other non-metallic mineral products
Fig. B.14: Countries and industry specific contributions to
the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers,
Metals
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Fig. B.15: Countries and industry specific contributions to
the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers,
Fabricated metal products, except machinery and
equipment
Fig. B.16: Countries and industry specific contributions to
the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers,
Machinery and equipment, nec
34
Fig. B.17: Countries and industry specific contributions to
the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers,
Electrical machinery and apparatus
Fig. B.18: Countries and industry specific contributions to
the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers,
Transport equipment
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Fig. B.19: Countries and industry specific contributions to
the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers,
Manufacturing nec; recycling (include Furniture)
Fig. B.20: Countries and industry specific contributions to
the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers,
Production and distribution of electricity, gas, and
water
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Fig. B.21: Countries and industry specific contributions to
the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers,
Construction
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Fig. B.22: Countries and industry specific contributions to
the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers,
Wholesale and retail trade
Fig. B.23: Countries and industry specific contributions to
the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers,
Service activities (transport, hotels and restaurants)
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Fig. B.24: Countries and industry specific contributions to
the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers,
Post and telecommunications
Fig. B.25: Countries and industry specific contributions to
the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers,
Business activities (finance, real estate, and R&D)
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Fig. B.26: Countries and industry specific contributions to
the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers,
Public administration, education and health
B.3 Country Specific Contributions to the Contemporary
and Rolling Technological Frontiers
The following 8 figures show the country specific contributions to the con-
temporary and rolling technological frontiers. The maximum value is equal
to the number of industries, 23, and would imply that the given country’s
wage-profit frontier coincided with the technological frontier.
Fig. B.27: Country specific contributions to the contemporary
technological frontiers, the US
40
Fig. B.28: Country specific contributions to the contemporary
technological frontiers, Germany
Fig. B.29: Country specific contributions to the contemporary
technological frontiers, the UK
41
Fig. B.30: Country specific contributions to the contemporary
technological frontiers, France
Fig. B.31: Country specific contributions to the contemporary
technological frontiers, Canada
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Fig. B.32: Country specific contributions to the contemporary
technological frontiers, Denmark
Fig. B.33: Country specific contributions to the contemporary
technological frontiers, Japan
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Fig. B.34: Country specific contributions to the contemporary
technological frontiers, Australia
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